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 ABSTRACT 
 
Undesirable tripping of generators contributed to the 1996 and 2003 blackouts in the 
U.S. Tripping of these generators initiated by over-excitation protection can lead to a 
shortage of reactive power supply. An effective way to prevent cascaded events is to identify 
the anticipated operations of generator protective devices such as over-current relays. For a 
given contingency, the post-disturbance field currents can be obtained from the results of 
steady-state contingency evaluation in the on-line security assessment process. However, 
their accuracy is inadequate compared with the post-contingency field current obtained from 
off-line time-domain dynamic simulations. In this thesis, a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) is 
proposed to correct discrepancies between post-contingency field currents obtained from 
steady state contingency evaluation and the corresponding values obtained from time-domain 
dynamic simulations. Post-contingency field currents obtained from steady-state security 
assessment can be corrected on-line using an FIS constructed off line. A 200-bus system 
model is used to validate the performance of the developed FIS.   
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CHAPTER1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background and Motivation 
Cascaded events such as transmission line and generator outages have contributed to 
catastrophic power failures, such as the U.S. Northeast blackout of 1965 [1] [2], New York 
power failure in 1977 [3], July 2 and August 10, 1996, outages on the western 
interconnection [4], and the blackout in the eastern interconnection in Aug. 2003 [5]. The 
undesirable tripping of generators caused by over-excitation protection contributed to the 
cascaded events in Aug. 10, 1996, WECC disturbance, Aug. 22, 1987, Tennessee disturbance, 
and June 5, 1967, PJM Disturbance [11].  
With the available technologies today, it is impossible to predict the cascaded events 
in real-time or ahead of time. However, it is possible to identify basic patterns leading to 
cascaded events based on the results of on-line steady state contingency evaluation that is 
performed every several minutes. Undesirable generator tripping by the over-excitation 
protection is one of the basic patterns leading to cascaded events. Identifying the existence of 
the relay operations ahead of time is an effective way to prevent cascaded generator tripping 
events. Once the undesirable cascaded generator tripping can be identified, the dispatchers 
will be able to take actions to reduce the armature and field currents of the generator(s) 
involved. These preventive actions may require several minutes. 
The proposed approach in this thesis is to extend the on-line security assessment 
framework that is based on a list of next contingencies. The identification of cascaded events 
will enhance our ability to avoid catastrophic outages. A Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) is 
developed to identify contingencies that are likely to trigger cascaded generator tripping. Off-
line time-domain simulation cases are performed for the construction of a rule base and 
verification of the performance. This thesis is concentrated on the cascaded generator 
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tripping events due to over-excitation protection. A related task in this research is concerned 
with cascaded distance relay tripping events following line contingencies [16]. 
 
1.2  Contributions of the Work 
This research leads to an innovative method to identify one of the basic patterns of 
cascaded events following a contingency, thereby reducing the possibility of large-scale 
blackouts. The proposed approach makes use of a fuzzy inference system to identify the 
generator tripping events due to over-excitation protection. The proposed system is expected 
to provide system operators with a vulnerability assessment report with warning signals on 
cascaded generator tripping events. This work is an extension of the on-line steady state 
security assessment framework that is the standard practice in industry. 
 
1.3  Thesis Organization 
Chapter 2 provides a review of past major blackouts in North America. It is shown 
that cascaded events such as transmission line and generator outages have contributed to 
catastrophic power failures. The chapter continues with a discussion of existing techniques 
for preventing wide area outages against cascaded events. Chapter 3 summarizes the basic 
patterns of cascaded events in blackouts and provides an explanation of the fuzzy inference 
system method. The chapter also gives an overview of the technical problem associated with 
cascaded events triggered by over-excitation protection. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of 
the proposed FIS based methodology that can be used to obtain the post-contingency field 
current. Chapter 5 includes the simulation results obtained from steady state and dynamic 
simulations on a 200 bus test system. Chapter 6 gives the conclusion and future work. 
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CHAPTER 2.  PREVETING BLACKOUTS AGAINST 
CASCADED EVENTS 
 
2.1  Review of Major Blackouts in North America 
There have been a number of major power system blackouts in North America. In this 
research, 5 scenarios were analyzed; the first one is the 1965 blackout in the Northeast, and 
the most recent one occurred on the Eastern Interconnection in 2003. These 5 major 
blackouts in North America are summarized in Table 1. A detailed description of these 
catastrophic failures can be found in references [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] and NERC’s website [6]. 
Table 1.  Major Blackouts in North America 
Date Location Scale in term of GW or Population 
Time Span of 
Cascaded 
Events  
9 November,1965 
[2] Northeast 20GW, 30M people 13 minutes 
13 July, 1977 [3] New York 6GW, 9M people 1 hour 
2 July, 1996 [6] Wyoming, Idaho 11.7GW, 1.5M people 36 seconds 
10 August, 1996 [4] Western Interconnection 30.5GW, 7.5M people > 6 minutes 
14 August, 2003 [5] Northeast 62GW, 50M people > 1 hour 
Northeast, November 9, 1965 
At 5:16 pm, November 9, 1965, a backup relay on one of five 230-KV transmission 
lines carrying power from the Niagara River north to the Toronto, Ontario, metropolitan area 
operated and disconnected the affected line. Within about 2.5 s, the remaining four 230-KV 
transmission lines became loaded and tripped out of service. Shortly after that, the Northeast 
area of the United States and a large part of Canada went dark. From Buffalo to the eastern 
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border of New Hampshire and from New York City to Ontario, a massive power outage 
struck without warning. By 5:40 p.m. that evening, 80,000 square miles of the Northeast 
United States and Ontario, Canada, were without power, leaving 30 million people in the 
dark [2]. 
New York, July 13, 1977 
At 8:37 pm, July 13, 1977, during a severe thunderstorm, lightning struck two extra-
high-voltage lines in northern Westchester County, at the northern extreme of Con Edison’s 
service area. At 8:56 p.m., two more lines were struck, and it led to the loss of a major 
generator and several other vital transmission lines. At 9:19 p.m. the final major 
interconnection to Upstate New York tripped due to a thermal overload. By 9:30 p.m., all tie 
lines to external sources were open. The customer load was too high for Con Edison’s 
available in-city sources of power. At 9:36 p.m., the system was completely shut down.  
Electric service to more than 8 million people in the metropolitan area and to the commercial 
and industrial users of this area was interrupted for periods from 5 to 25 hours [3].  
WECC, July 2, 1996 
At 1:25 pm on July 2, 1996, a significant disturbance occurred on the interconnected 
transmission systems of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC). A short 
circuit occurred on the 345 kV transmission line between the Jim Bridger plant near Rock 
Springs and the Goshen substation near Idaho Falls, and it was tripped successfully. This 
disturbance caused a parallel line to be tripped. Loss of the lines initiated a protective action 
that shut down two generating units at the Jim Bridger plant.  The under-voltage and inter-
area oscillation problem developed quickly throughout the system and five islands were 
formed. At least 1.5 million customers were affected in this catastrophic blackout [6]. 
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WECC, August 10, 1996 
At 3:48 pm on August 10, 1996, hot weather throughout the West coast contributed to 
widespread high power demands. Random multiple transmission line outages occurred 
during a period of about one hour and weakened the system, leading to voltage oscillations. 
As a result, three 500 kV Pacific AC Inter-tie lines and the +/- 500 kV Pacific DC Inter-tie 
lines between Oregon and California were lost. The successive random outages over a short 
period of time pushed the system into an abnormal condition. Consequently, about 7.5 
million customers in the Western Interconnection were interrupted [6]. 
US Midwest and Northeast/Canada, August 14, 2003 
At 1:31 pm on August 14, 2003, the First Energy’s Eastlake unit 5 was tripped in the 
Northern Ohio service area due to high reactive power output. After 3:05 pm, a sequence of 
lines tripped, causing heavy loadings on a number of other transmission lines. The critical 
event leading to widespread cascading in Ohio and beyond was the tripping of the Sammis-
Star 345-kV line at 4:05 pm. After that, more than 508 generation units at 265 power plants 
were lost in less than ten minutes. The northern part of the Eastern Interconnection was 
broken into five islands. About 50 million people lost power in this blackout and 61,800 
megawatts of load were lost in most of New York state as well as parts of Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Michigan, and Ontario, Canada [5]. 
 
2.2  Characteristics of Cascaded Events in Major Blackouts 
An analysis of the five major blackouts summarized above shows that all these major 
blackouts involve complex sequences of cascaded events. In general, these cascaded events 
were initiated by a single event or a combination of events, such as the misoperation of a 
backup zone-3 relay in the 1965 blackout, two lightening strokes in the 1977 blackout, the 
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Blackout
Initiating Events:
- Equipment Failures and Malfuctions
- Line Trips  Due to Relay Misoperation
- Generation Outages Due to Relay Operation 
- Line Trips Due to Overload/Tree Contact/Fault
- Communication and Information Problems
- Human Errors 
Cascaded Outages:
- Additional Equipment Failures and Malfuctions
- Cascaded Overloaded line Outages
- Cascaded Generation Outages
System becomes vulnerable
Final Stages of Collapse
- System splits into uncontrollable islands
- Unbalance of power generation and demand 
causes to frequency collapse
- Unbalance of reactive power supply and 
demand causes to voltage collapse
line outages in the July and August 1996 blackouts and the generator tripping in the 2003 
blackout. Following the initiating contingencies, the cascaded events occurred in a sequence.  
 The general sequence of the events in major blackouts is illustrated in Figure 1. The 
causes of cascaded events in the past five major blackouts are summarized in Table 2.  
Figure 1.  Sequence of Events Leading to Blackout 
As it is shown in Table 2, the causes of cascaded events leading to catastrophic 
outages are usually complex. They may involve faults, equipment failures, malfunctions, 
communication and information problems, misoperation of protection equipments, and 
human errors, etc. The external factors can also contribute to the events, e.g., tree contacts, 
lightening, and excessive line sagging in summer.  
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Table 2.  Major Causes of Cascaded Events in Major Blackouts 
It is also observed that four out of the five past blackouts occurred in summer when 
the power system was heavily stressed. The reason is that the higher load brings more 
pressure for the system to maintain the voltage profile. Thus, a single event is more likely to 
trigger other events that can cause a large blackout. If proper planning criteria are followed, 
most power systems are designated to be able to operate safely such that a single initial event 
will not cause further cascaded failures [14]. However, if the system is operating under the 
peak load condition, depending on the severity of the event, the system may enter an 
emergency state following the disturbance. If proper control actions or operator intervention 
are not taken in a timely manner, the system may be susceptible to further failures and 
subsequent cascading. 
 
2.3  Undesirable Relay Tripping in Cascaded Events    
As mentioned in Section 1.2, events that contribute to the cascaded sequences are 
probabilistic in nature. Therefore, it is not feasible to predict the cascaded events that will 
occur in the future. However, it is useful to determine the basic patterns of cascading, i.e., 
which event may trigger other event(s).  
 Nov,1965 July,1977 July,1996 Aug ,1996 Aug ,2003
Environment Reasons 
(Tree contact, lighting, 
etc) 
 √ √ √ √ 
Equipment Failures and 
Malfunctions √ √ √ √ √ 
Communication and 
Information Problems     √ 
Misoperation of 
Protection Equipments √  √ √ √ 
Human errors 
 √    
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The undesirable zone 3 relay operations and undesirable generator tripping by over-
excitation protection are two of the basic patterns. As shown in Table 2, undesirable zone 3 
relay and other generation and transmission backup relay operations have contributed to the 
1965, 1996 and 2003 blackouts [11]. A study by the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) indicates that protective relays are involved in about 75 percent of 
major disturbances [4]. Given the importance of undesirable relay operations, recognition of 
these two basic patterns becomes a critical step toward the understanding of cascaded events.  
2.3.1 Undesirable Zone 3 Relay Operation  
One of the basic patterns of cascaded events is the undesirable zone 3 relay operations 
that do not involve a fault. Undesirable zone 3 relay operations can lead to unnecessary loss 
of transmission lines [15]. These zone 3 relay operations can be caused by power flows 
transferred to the lines due to a fault at different line. See Figure 2. Due to removal of Line 1, 
the heavy power flow on Line 2 causes a low voltage and high current condition. As a result, 
the apparent impedance viewed by the zone 3 relay on Line 2 is more likely to enter the zone 
3 reach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Relationship between A Line Fault and Cascaded Zone 3 Relay Operation(s) 
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The critical event for the 1965 Northeast Blackout was a false operation of an 
impedance relay initiated by load current [1]. The critical event for the Aug 14, 2003 Eastern 
blackout was also an inappropriate zone 3 relay operation caused by high real and reactive 
load current and depressed system voltage [5].  
2.3.2 Undesirable Generator Tripping by Over-Excitation Protection  
Undesirable generator tripping by over-excitation is another basic pattern of cascaded 
events. Generator tripping by over-excitation protection can reduce the reactive power supply 
in the system, causing the system voltage profile to decline. One generator tripping may 
trigger another generator to trip, leading to cascaded events.  
(a)                                                       (b)     
Figure 3.  Example of Cascaded Generator Tripping 
Figure 3 shows an example of cascaded generator tripping caused by over-excitation 
protection. In Figure 3 (a), due to a fault on line B3-B4, the bus voltage at B3 falls and the 
field current of G2 increases. If line B3-B4 is heavily loaded and MW output of G2 is also at 
a high level before the contingency, the line outage can cause a heavy loading condition of 
G2, and therefore the unit may be tripped by its over-excitation protection. Tripping of G2 
G2
G1
 Load
G2
G1
 Load
B3 B3
Line flow
B4 B4
B1
B2 B2
B1
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can cause further reduction of the reactive power supply in the system. As shown in Figure 3 
(b), generator G1 becomes overloaded after G2 is lost and G1 may also be tripped by its own 
over-excitation protection. 
Undesirable tripping of generators initiated by over-excitation protection contributed 
to the 1996 and 2003 blackouts in the U.S. The first event in the Aug. 14, 2003, blackout is 
the Eastlake 5 generator tripping. It was an excitation system failure—as voltage fell at the 
generator bus, the generator tried to increase its voltage on the AC winding of the machine 
quickly. This caused excessive armature and field currents on the generators and finally led 
the generator’s excitation protection scheme to trip the plant [5]. Furthermore, between 16:05 
and 16:10 at that day, 29 generators tripped, which triggered the first major power swing. 
These trips were caused by the generators’ protective relays that are responding to 
overloaded transmission lines. Many of these trips were reported as under-voltage and over-
current [5].  
In the Aug.10, 1996, blackout, over-voltage during the disturbance caused relay 
operations due to the manual excitation control. However, even if automatic excitation 
control is in service, it is possible that the post-contingency power system requires a 
significant amount of VARs. The consequence may be excessive armature and field currents 
on the generators that increase the risks of voltage instability. 
 
2.4  State-of-the-Art on Prevention of Cascaded Events 
Some studies concerning blackouts have centered on the goal of preventing cascaded 
events from starting, or at least, reducing their rate of occurrence. This section provides a 
survey of the state-of-the-art on the prevention of cascaded events. 
The conceptual design of the Strategic Power Infrastructure Defense (SPID) system 
that is aimed at prevention of the wide area grid outages against cascaded events has been 
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developed [7]. By incorporating multi-agent system technologies, the SPID system is 
intended to assess the power system vulnerability, monitor hidden failures of protective 
devices and provide adaptive control actions to prevent catastrophic failures and cascading 
sequences of events.  
The Special Protection Scheme (SPS) is used as an event-based emergency control 
for mitigating conditions that can cause unusual stress on the power system [8]. SPS is based 
on direct detection of predefined outages, with high-speed binary signals to control centers 
for logic decisions, and then to power plants and substations for generator tripping and 
capacitor/reactor bank switching. Disadvantages of SPSs include their control capability only 
for predefined events, complexity, and high costs [8]. 
 A response-based Wide-Area stability and voltage Control System (WACS) has been 
developed [9]. WACS is a technology to use system-wide information together with 
distributed local intelligence and communication of selected information between separate 
locations to counteract propagation of major disturbances in the power system [10]. This 
technique is aimed at better management of the system condition during the disturbances and 
more reliable system performance under high power transfers. 
A concept of Wide Area Monitoring and Control (WAMC) to mitigate cascaded 
events using a steady state approach is reported in [11]. WAMC could act in the early stage 
of the cascading failures and prevent it from spreading. A WAMC based approach is 
established to determine the boundary between the initiating event and its subsequent 
cascaded spreading. The WAMC long-term impact on the network is studied in [11]. 
The hidden failures in protection systems have been identified as key contributors of 
the cascaded events. A technique to catalog and analyze the possible hidden failures in the 
protection systems is presented in [12]. The basic idea of this method is to identify the modes 
in which the protection systems may fail to operate correctly and the consequences of these 
failure modes.  
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A tripping of the generator by an armature over-current relay or the activation of an 
armature current limiter will severely cripple the power system which often causes the 
breakdown of the system voltages [17]. In [17], a MW rescheduling strategy that alleviates 
the over-current condition on the armature is proposed. This method is to make small 
changes in the active power production of the generator, thereby fully utilizing the capability 
of the generator.  
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CHAPTER 3.  TECHNICAL PROBLEMS 
 
3.1  Problem Formulation 
The purpose of this research is to estimate the post-contingency field currents in order 
to identify cascaded events triggered by over-excitation protection. To obtain accurate field 
currents, time-domain simulations are performed off line. Figure 4 shows a simplified over-
current relay characteristic curve [17]. Once the post-contingency field current is obtained, 
which is illustrated by the red line in Figure 4, the relay operating time can be estimated 
using the relay characteristic curve in Figure 4. Note that there is a threshold pick-up value 
(indicated by vertical dotted line) for over-current relay to operate.   
Figure 4.  Time/Current Characteristics for Field Over-Current Relay Model  
To obtain accurate field currents, time-domain simulations need to be performed off 
line. Magnetic saturation and controllers of generators, load characteristics, and other control 
devices need to be modeled in the time-domain simulations. 
To illustrate the computation time of time-domain simulations for a large system, it is 
noted that it takes approximately 5 minutes for PSS/E to perform a 10 second simulation on a 
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15,000 bus system based on 3 GHz Pentium CPU and 1GB RAM, Clearly, it is infeasible to 
conduct many time-domain simulations for different contingency scenarios in operational 
environment. The proposed time-domain simulations are performed off line.  
On-line steady state security assessment is commonly performed in the Energy 
Management System (EMS) environment. Contingency analysis is an important part of 
security assessment. The post-contingency field current can be obtained from contingency 
analysis results. However, steady state power flow calculations do not incorporate dynamic 
models of the power system such as generator controllers, voltage controls, and load 
characteristics. As a result, the post-contingency field current obtained from steady state 
power flow results usually do not match the value obtained from time-domain dynamic 
simulations. As the dynamics of a power system become more significant, the discrepancy is 
also wider.   
In this thesis work, a fuzzy rule based method is proposed to determine the post-
contingency field current. The post-contingency field current obtained by steady state power 
flow calculation is corrected using fuzzy rules constructed from off-line time-domain 
simulation results. 
 
3.2 Fuzzy Inference System Approach 
3.2.1  What is fuzzy logic? 
Fuzzy logic is used to handle the concept of partial truth instead of absolute truth. The 
concept of fuzzy logic was established by Dr. Lotfi Zadeh at UC-Berkeley in the 1960’s [16]. 
It was introduced as a method to handle the uncertainty of verbal terms. Basically, Fuzzy 
Logic is a multivalued logic, which allows intermediate values to be defined between 
conventional evaluations like high/median/low.  
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In fuzzy logic, membership functions are used to define a degree of membership of a 
particular term. Several fuzzy sets are assigned to each variable to cover its domain and it is 
common for these sets to overlap so that the entire domain will be covered. In general, 
symmetric membership functions that peak at a value of one such as triangular, trapezoidal, 
Gaussian, or bell-shaped are used. Intermediate membership functions may be added to the 
decision alternatives as well as the inputs to increase the accuracy of the network. These 
values can be reduced to more specific membership functions (e.g. very low, median high) if 
necessary. An example membership plot for input variable voltage in per unit is given in 
Figure 5. 
Figure 5.  Membership Functions for Input Variable Voltage (Per Unit) 
Fuzzy sets and fuzzy operators are the subjects and verbs of fuzzy logic. Once fuzzy 
sets are established, the if-then rule statements are used to formulate the conditional 
statements that comprise fuzzy logic. Rules may be specified by an expert as well as learned 
from training data automatically.   
For example, for a generator, a rule could be: 
If Post-Contingency Reactive Power Output is High and Terminal Voltage is Low, 
then Post-Contingency Terminal Current is High. 
Here, the fuzzy variables are per unit Post-Contingency Reactive Power Output, 
Terminal Voltage and Post-Contingency Terminal Current of a generator. Other logical 
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operators such as NOT and OR may be used as well. Methods for implementing the operators 
must be selected for the system. Some examples are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Fuzzy Logic Operators 
Method Not A A AND B A OR B 
Product/Sum 1-A A * B A + B 
Max/Min 1-A Max(A,B) Min(A,B) 
3.2.2  What is Fuzzy Inference System? 
Fuzzy inference is the process of formulating the mapping from given inputs to an 
output using fuzzy logic. The mapping provides a basis from which decisions can be reached, 
or patterns discerned. The process of fuzzy inference involves all elements that are described 
in the previous sections: Membership Functions, Logical Operations, and If-Then Rules.  
Once a fuzzy system has been specified, a defuzzification method must be selected. 
In this research, a commonly used centroid defuzzification method is applied. The first step 
in this method is the aggregation of memberships of the fuzzy sets in the output variable 
given the firing level of each rule. The firing level is calculated by the total membership of 
each antecedent in the rule base using the appropriate operator method. Then, the rule firing 
level (product of degree of certainty) is applied to each consequent fuzzy set. The final crisp 
output value is the centroid of all fuzzy output sets. 
3.2.3  Why Fuzzy Inference System is applied? 
Fuzzy inference systems have been widely applied in control systems, data 
classification, decision analysis, expert systems, and other rule based systems. The main 
reasons why fuzzy inference systems are successfully used could be described as follows: 
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1. Fuzzy inference system is suitable for uncertain (include fuzziness, inaccurate, or 
incomplete data) or approximate reasoning (incomplete or inaccurate formulas or inference 
rules). 
2. Fuzzy inference system is suitable for the system with a mathematical model that is 
difficult to derive. 
3. Fuzzy inference system can make decision with estimated values under incomplete 
information. 
4. Fuzzy inference system allows representation of descriptive or qualitative 
expressions, which are more natural than mathematical. 
5. In a fuzzy inference system, describing the rules is usually simpler and easier, and 
thus the systems can execute faster than conventional systems. 
In this research, it is intended to determine the post-contingency field current. It is 
difficult to establish a precise mathematical model that describes the detailed and complex 
dynamic behaviors of the system. However, with fuzzy rules constructed from off-line time-
domain simulation results, a fuzzy inference system can help to find the relationship between 
the time-domain simulation results and the steady state power flow results. The detailed 
methodology and procedure is introduced in the following sections. 
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CHAPTER 4.  METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES 
 
4.1  Calculation of Field Current Using Steady State Power Flow 
Solution 
In the proposed approach, the post-contingency field current is calculated using 
steady state power flow solution that provides MWs, MVARs, and bus voltages. The field 
current ifd can be obtained by Eq. (4-1) 
                                          (4-1) 
 
where, eq is the internal voltage, ra is the armature resistance, xd is the direct-axis 
synchronous reactance, xad is the mutual inductance, and id and iq are the dq components of 
the armature current. Figure 6 shows the steady state phasor diagram of synchronous 
machines. The current components id and iq are calculated using armature current It, the 
internal angle δ, and power factor angle ϕ  as shown in Eq. (4-2) and Eq. (4-3). 
)sin( ϕδ += td Ii                                                                                                 (4-2) 
)cos( ϕδ += tq Ii                                                                                                       (4-3) 
As shown in Eq. (4-4) and Eq. (4-5), the terminal current It and power angleϕ are 
calculated using active power Pt, reactive power Qt, and terminal voltage Et . 
As shown in Eq. (4-6), the internal angle δ is calculated using the terminal voltage Et, 
quadrature-axis synchronous reactance xq and Eq. (4-4) and Eq. (4-5). 
As shown in Eq. (4-7), the internal voltage eq is calculated using terminal voltage Et 
and Eq. (4-6). 
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Figure 6.  Steady-State Phasor Diagram 
            Since generator constants in Eq (1) are pre-designated data obtained through the 
factory test and active power, reactive power, and terminal voltage are obtained by steady 
state power flow, the steady state post-contingency field current can be calculated using 
power flow results of the contingency evaluation process. 
 
4.2  Correction of Post-Contingency Field Current 
As shown in Figure 7, the proposed approach is to correct the post-contingency field 
current in two steps. 1) Developing a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) using off-line time-
domain dynamic simulated data, 2) Obtaining a correction term to be added to the post-
contingency field current calculated using the steady state power flow. As illustrated in 
 
ϕ
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Figure 7 a), a fuzzy rule base is automatically generated with specified fuzzy logic variables 
and membership functions. The fuzzy rule base is constructed by an adaptive learning 
algorithm developed by Wang and Mendel. Pre- and post-contingency steady state power 
flow and power flow snapshots obtained by time-domain simulations are used for the training 
and development of the fuzzy rule base.  
 
             a) Off-Line Approach for Constructing of the Fuzzy Rule Base 
 
            b) On-Line Environment for Application of FIS 
       Figure 7.  FIS for Correction of the Post-Contingency Field Current  
It is noted that a post-contingency power flow snapshot obtained from time-domain 
simulation is necessary for the development of FIS. Once FIS is developed, only pre- and 
post-contingency steady state power flow and post-contingency field current from steady 
state contingency evaluation are needed to obtain the corrected post-contingency field current. 
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4.3 Input and Output of FIS 
The proposed FIS method is to correct the post-contingency field current based on the 
steady state power flow result. Hence, the output of FIS is the estimated value of the 
discrepancy between the post-contingency field currents obtained using time-domain 
simulation and steady state power flow, respectively.  
The loss of heavily loaded transmission lines can cause voltage degradation at the 
load buses and increases the reactive power demand on the generators. A simple two-
machine-one-load system shown in Figure 8 is used to illustrate the change in system 
conditions. Table 4 shows the pre- and post-contingency steady state power flow and the 
power flow snapshot obtained by time-domain simulation following a line tripping. 
 
                                     Figure 8.  Two-Machine-One-Load System 
Table 4.  One Contingency Simulation Result 
 Pt Qt Et EL PL QL 
Pre-pf 2.21 0.50 1.03 1.00 2.20 0.20 
Post-pf 2.22 1.21 1.03 0.88 2.20 0.20 
Post-td 2.05 0.88 1.03 0.93 2.04 0.17 
                                                                                               All of the values are in per unit 
Pre-pf: Pre-Contingency Power Flow Solution 
Post-pf: Post-Contingency Power Flow Solution 
Post-td: Post-Contingency Power Flow Snapshot Obtained by Time-domain Simulation 
As shown in Table 4, the post-contingency terminal voltage Et and active power Pt 
obtained by power flow solutions are almost the same as the pre-contingency values. 
However, the post-contingency reactive power output of G1, Qt, is clearly higher than the 
pre-contingency value. The table also shows that post-contingency load bus voltage EL 
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obtained by steady state power flow is lower than that obtained by time-domain simulation. 
The discrepancy can be caused by the load voltage characteristics, as shown in Eq. (4-8). 
2
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛×=
o
o V
VQQ  (4-8) 
In time-domain simulation, when the load bus voltage declines due to a contingency 
such as a line tripping, the bus voltage degradation is mitigated by a reduction of reactive 
power loads, which can be seen by the load voltage characteristics. In contrast, for the steady 
state power flow, there is no reduction of the reactive power load as a load bus is modeled as 
a PQ bus. The reduction of reactive power loads can be significant at load buses near the 
contingency location. 
The discrepancy of the reactive power models results in a difference between the 
generator reactive power output obtained by steady state power flow and time-domain 
simulation. As mentioned previously, the reactive power demand obtained by steady state 
power flow is not mitigated by load characteristics.  The generator reactive power output 
obtained by steady state power flow is expected to be higher than that the value obtained by 
time-domain simulation. Note that the overestimated reactive power load may lead to “false 
alarm” when the field currents are used to identify the relays that will trip.  
The discrepancies of the steady state power flow results and the time-domain 
simulation results exist in the generator reactive power and load bus voltages. Hence, the 
post-contingency generator reactive power output and the mean value of voltage degradation 
in the designated area are used as inputs for the FIS, i.e., input 1 and input 3 in Figure 9. 
The post-contingency field current can increase from the pre-contingency value.                        
When the increment between the pre- and post-contingency field currents obtained from 
power flow solutions is high, the difference of post-contingency field currents obtained from 
time-domain simulation and steady state power flow is also significant. Therefore, the 
increment of the post-contingency field current obtained by steady state power flow is used 
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as an input, Input 2. All three inputs can be obtained from the results of on-line steady state 
contingency evaluation. 
Figure 9.  Input and output of FIS 
 
4.4 Wang and Mendel’s Algorithm 
The adaptive learning algorithm proposed by Wang and Mendel provides an efficient 
technique for fuzzy inference systems. By Wang and Mendel’s algorithm, the basic 
procedure to generate an FIS consists of following steps [18]:  
1) Dividing the input and output spaces of the given numerical data into regions of 
the fuzzy variable, 
2) Generating fuzzy rules from the given data, 
3) Assigning a degree to each of the generated rules, 
4) Combining the generated rules with linguistic rules of human experts, and 
5) Determining a mapping from input space to output space using a defuzzification 
procedure. 
The above procedure only passes through the dataset one time. Hence, time-
consuming iterative training is avoided. Moreover, the membership functions are pre-defined 
in this algorithm. Therefore, it provides users with a higher level of flexibility.  
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An example of the FIS using Wang-Mendel’s algorithm is given in Figure 10. In the 
input-output dataset, input1 Q=0.65 has a degree of 0.75 on membership function M and a 
degree of 0.25 on H. The input2 Vdrop=15 has a degree of 1 on H. The output I=0.375 has a 
degree of 0.75 on H and a degree of 0.25 on L. As shown in Figure 10, two rules are 
generated from the input-output dataset. However, these two rules have the same IF part but 
a different Then part and therefore they are “in conflict.” In this case, the rule that has a 
higher degree value is adopted. In this example, rule1 is adopted in the rule base because 
rule1 has a higher degree than rule2. By this conflict resolution procedure, the number of 
rules is reduced.  
               Figure 10.  Example Procedure of Generating Fuzzy Rules 
The centroid defuzzication method is applied to obtain the output of FIS. The output 
becomes a single number by calculating the center of gravity or center of area. Figure 11 
shows an example of the centroid calculation procedure. In the upper right table in Figure 11, 
it is assumed that input1 has a degree of 0.8 on membership function M and degree of 0.2 on 
H. Input2 has a degree of 0.7 on M and degree of 0.3 on H. Figure 11 shows four rules that 
are satisfied. The degree of output mo is derived using product operation for the degree of 
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each input. For example, for the rule: “IF input 1 is M and input2 is M, Then output is L,” the 
degree of the rule mo is 0.56 that is derived from the product of 0.7 and 0.8. See the upper 
left table in Figure 11. Note that D in Figure 11 denotes the center value of the output region. 
(The center of a fuzzy region is defined as the point that has the smallest absolute value 
among all the points at which the membership function for this region has membership value 
equal to one.) D of membership function L equals to 0.2, D of M equals to 0.3 and D of H 
equals to 0.4. Consequently, the output value is 0.27 which is derived from the equation in 
Figure 11 which determines the center of gravity of the fuzzy sets. 
            Figure 11.  Example Procedure of Centroid Defuzzification 
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CHAPTER 5.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
In order to evaluate the performance of the developed FIS, a case study is performed 
using a 200-bus test system. This test system is a variation of the simplified model of the 
western inter-connection in the U.S. The demonstration in this section is based on PSS/E 
power flow solutions and PSS/E time-domain simulations. Four different load levels, shown 
in Table 5, are created by changing generation and loads. FIS is developed for correction of 
its post-contingency field current and is applied to the generator G43 in Figure 12. 
 In this research, line outages such as single line and multiple line tripping are 
considered. A total of 36 different line contingencies are included in the training datasets. 
Also, 15 load buses in the dotted square area shown in Figure 12 are selected for calculation 
of the mean value of voltage degradation following the contingency. Note that the line 
contingencies close to G43 result in a relatively high level of voltage degradation around 
those 15 load buses. The degradation is around 3 times higher than the average voltage 
degradation of the entire system. 
Table 5.  Training Datasets 
Load Condition V-G43(pu) P-G43(MW) Number of Datasets 
100%Peak Load 1.05  79 
95%Peak Load 1.05  32 
90%Peak Load 1.02  9 
75%Peak Load 1.05 
486.0, 437.3, 388.8, 
340.2 291.6, 194.4,  
 97.2 
27 
V: Terminal Voltage, P: Generator Active Power Output 
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5.1 Description of Test System 
 Figure 12 shows the simplified diagram of test system. Table 6 shows the 
specification of the system model. 
                         Figure 12.  One-Line Diagram of The 200-Bus System 
                       Table 6.  Specification of 200 Bus System Model 
Item  
Number of Buses 199 
Number of Machines 31 
Number of branches 229 
Static Load 19816 MW 
Generation 50671 MW 
Reactors 8087.5 Mvar 
Capacitors 4070 Mvar 
Generator Control Models AVR, PSS, GOV 
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5.2 Training Datasets 
A total of 7 active power output levels of G43, ranging from 97.2 to 486 MW, are 
used to vary the field current. Note that the rated capacity of G43 is 540MVA and the rated 
MW output is 486MW. As shown in Table 6, the total number of the training datasets is 147. 
Although various MW output levels and line contingencies are used, the output values tend 
to be small. To enhance the performance of FIS by spreading the data points in a wider range, 
the logarithm function is applied to the output on the basis of Eq. (5-1). 
)0.05(Output+logLN eOutput −=                                                                                        (5-1)  
The number of membership functions of input1 is 3, the numbers of membership 
functions of input2, input3 and output are 7, respectively. A FIS rule base is shown in Table 
7. 
Table 7.  Fuzzy Rule Base  
Num Input1 Input2 Input3 LNOutput Output 
1 L VL H 2.83 -0.00901 
2 L VL VH 2.83 -0.00901 
3 L L M-H 1.94 -0.0937 
4 L L H 2.38 -0.0426 
5 L L-M L-M 1.50 -0.173 
6 L L-M M 1.50 -0.173 
7 M L M-H 2.38 -0.0426 
8 M L H 2.38 -0.0426 
9 M L-M M 1.50 -0.173 
10 M L-M M-H 1.94 -0.0937 
11 M L-M H 2.38 -0.0426 
12 M M L-M 1.06 -0.296 
13 M M M 1.50 -0.173 
14 M M-H L 1.06 -0.296 
15 M M-H L-M 1.06 -0.296 
16 H M-H L-M 1.06 -0.296 
17 H H L 0.616 -0.490 
LNOutput = - loge (output+0.05), VL: Very low, L: Low, M: Medium, H: High, VH: Very 
high 
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4.2 Validation of Proposed Fuzzy Inference System 
In order to verify the developed FIS, 10 contingency scenarios that are not included in 
the training datasets are developed. From Figure 13 and Table 8, it can be seen that the 
corrected post-contingency field currents by FIS are close to the post-contingency field 
currents obtained by time-domain simulation. The maximum mismatch between the two field 
currents is 4.73%. 
Figure 13.  Corrected Post-Contingency Field Current for 10 Validation Scenarios 
Table 8.  Corrected Post-Contingency Field Current for Testing Scenarios 
N Input1 Input2 Input3 Output Ifd-fis Ifd-pf Ifd-tds ROT-fis ROT-pf ROT-tds Error
1 692.0 0.46 -10.73 -0.229 1.233 1.462 1.240 67.88 29.94 64.57 -0.007
2 807.6 0.62 -13.77 -0.351 1.210 1.561 1.213 78.04 26.75 77.01 -0.003
3 351.2 0.06 -1.997 -0.024 1.080 1.104 1.080 N/A N/A N/A 0.000
4 424.2 0.15 -4.259 -0.052 1.069 1.121 1.073 N/A 119.6 N/A -0.004
5 778.0 0.59 -12.84 -0.301 1.223 1.524 1.214 72.61 27.93 76.43 0.008
6 302.1 0.01 -0.284 -0.009 1.043 1.052 1.046 N/A N/A N/A -0.003
7 565.3 0.30 -8.913 -0.173 1.167 1.341 1.120 98.11 47.04 120 0.049
8 292.2 0.00 -0.073 -0.009 0.996 1.005 1.005 N/A N/A N/A -0.009
9 556.3 0.32 -8.810 -0.173 1.079 1.252 1.032 N/A 59.66 N/A 0.047
10 295.1 0.00 -0.070 -0.009 1.036 1.045 1.045 N/A N/A N/A -0.009
N: Scenario Nunber, Ifd: Post-Contingency Field Current, pf: Steady State Power Flow, fis: 
Fuzzy Inference System, tds: Time-Domain Simulation, ROT: Relay Operation Time (in 
seconds), Error: The Difference of Post-Contingency Field Current Obtained by FIS and 
Time-Domain Simulation 
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 Figure 14 shows the post-contingency field current and the corresponding field over-
current relay operating time for the first validation scenario. Note that the relay operating 
time obtained by time-domain simulation is 64.6 seconds after the line contingency, while 
the relay operating time obtained by steady state power flow is 29.9 seconds after the line 
contingency. The relay operating time corrected by FIS is 67.9 seconds after the line 
contingency. Thus, the relay operating time can be corrected properly through the proposed 
FIS. 
Figure 14.  Validation Scenario 1 
Figure 15 shows the post-contingency field current and the corresponding field over-
current relay operating time for the ninth validation scenario. It can be seen that the relay 
operating time obtained by steady state power flow is 59.7 seconds after the contingency. On 
the other hand, the relay operating time obtained by time-domain simulation cannot be 
specified because the field current did not exceed the threshold current. The ninth scenario is 
critical. Without the FIS, the steady state power flow would have incorrectly predicted that 
this field current relay will trip. 
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Figure 15.  Validation Scenario 9 
Figure 16 shows the time-domain simulation results for scenario 7. The contingency, 
which is a three phase to ground fault, occurs at 0 seconds in Figure 16. Following the 
contingency, the faulted lines are tripped after 60 ms. 
           Figure 16.   Simulation Results with or without FIS for Validation Scenario 7  
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Without the FIS, G43 is tripped at 137 seconds because the field current IFD 
continuously exceeds the threshold (1.12 per unit) for 120 seconds, which results in an 
excessive reactive power output from G149 after 137 seconds. The maximum reactive power 
of G149 is 1 per unit. See the alternate long and short dash line in Figure 16. If one considers 
the change of power system conditions such as load increases, it is highly possible that 
another generator (G149) would trip by the over-excitation protection.  
With the FIS, the undesired G43 tripping can be prevented by reducing the terminal 
voltage from 1.05 per unit to 1.02 per unit. As shown in Figure 16, the field current IFD is 
lower than the threshold after the contingency. The reactive power output of G149 is also 
within the allowable range. Thus, the proposed FIS can serve as the basis for determination 
of the remedial actions needed to prevent undesirable generator tripping. 
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CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this research, the FIS technique is proposed for the identification of cascaded 
generator tripping events caused by field over-current relays. The proposed method is 
developed in the framework of on-line steady state security assessment. For a given list of 
next contingencies, the proposed method is developed to identify the contingencies that will 
be followed by cascaded generator tripping events. The FIS is based on fuzzy rules 
constructed automatically using off line time-domain simulation results. The FIS categorizes 
the detailed simulation cases into rules and allow uncertainties through fuzzy logic. The 
proposed FIS performs well as the rules used for correction are derived from detailed time-
domain simulations.  
The proposed method is based on an on-line security assessment framework. The list 
of next contingencies is hypothetical, i.e., they have not occurred. As a result, if appropriate, 
system operators have the time needed to take remedial actions to reduce the field current. 
Remedial actions may include generator re-dispatch or reduction of terminal voltages.   
The developed FIS can easily be applied for another over-excitation protection such 
as armature over-current relay, because the relay characteristic of armature current is the 
same as the characteristics of field current relay. 
Although significant progress has been made in this research, the following important 
issues remain to be addressed in the future work: 
1. The field or armature current limiter should be examined. 
2. Magnetic Saturation should be incorporated. 
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